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I. INTRODUCTION
Question: Mr. Smith, you have claimed that your ex-wife and her boyfriend were
shot accidentally?
Answer: That is correct.
Q: Did the gun you were carrying have a safety?
A: Of course it did.
Q: Was that safety on when you first picked up the gun?
A: Yes it was.
Q: Was the safety on when you approached the victims?
A: No, it was not.'
The above line of questioning destroyed the defendant's chance of be-
ing acquitted. 2 Surprisingly, however, the questions that sealed the de-
fendant's fate were raised by a juror after the prosecutor had failed to
elicit the devastating facts.'
The notion of allowing jurors to question witnesses during a trial is
not a novel one,4 but the governmental entities responsible for supervis-
ing the court system never have encouraged the practice.' As a result,
juror questioning is not widespread.' This situation, however, may be
changing. During 1989 judges in at least thirty states, including New
York, California, and Connecticut, agreed to conduct the first nation-
wide experiment in which jury members could question witnesses in
both civil and criminal trials and inform the judges of any need for
additional information. 7 The experiment has generated significant na-
1. This exchange was adapted from a New York Times description of a Wisconsin case in
which the defendant was charged with shooting his ex-wife and her boyfriend. Wiehl, The Law:
After 200 Years, the Silent Juror Learns to Talk, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at B5, col. 3. The New
York Times reported that the defendant "denied that he had ever intended to fire his weapon." Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Federal courts have allowed jurors to question witnesses in certain situations since 1954.
See United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 887 (1954). One of the first
reported cases allowing the practice was in 1907. See State v. Kendall, 143 N.C. 659, 57 S.E. 340
(1907). Some sources believe, however, that judges began allowing jurors to ask questions as early
as the 1890s. See, e.g., Maxwell, Researching Jury Participation, ABA J., Dec. 1989, at 36.
5. Maxwell, supra note 4, at 36. See generally Annotation, Propriety of Jurors Asking Ques-
tions in Open Court During Course of Trial, 31 A.L.R.3d 872 (1970).
6. See P. DIPERNA, JuRIEs ON TRIAL 231 (1984); Maxwell, supra note 4, at 36; Annotation,
supra note 5, at 872.
7. Wiehl, supra note 1, at B5, col. 3. The study involved more than 500 trials. Id. A $100,000
grant by the American Judicature Society and the State Justice Institute financed the study.
[Vol. 44:117
1991] JURORS QUESTIONING WITNESSES 119
tional media attention and has sparked public debate among trial law-
yers, judges, and jury psychologists.'
The jury's basic function is to resolve the questions of fact
presented during the course of the trial and to do so within established
trial procedure.' The jury is, however, under two severe handicaps.
First, courtroom procedures often are foreign to the members of the
panel. Second, attorneys present evidence through one-way communica-
tion-the attorneys talk and the jurors listen.'0 In most courtrooms in
the United States today, two-way communication is allowed between
the members of the jury and the lawyers only when the jury renders a
verdict.1 Considering that most interpersonal encounters in daily life
use two-way communication, the one-way communication process uti-
lized in American courtrooms is unusual. 2
Researchers have concluded that two-way communication, in which
one person talks while the other listens and eventually responds, is es-
sential to transferring information from one person to another.'" When
people have direct conversations, they have an opportunity to refine
and clarify each message by asking questions.' Without the implicit
feedback of two-way communication, the sender often is unsure
whether the message has been distorted or vital pieces of information
have been omitted.'5 These uncertainties can arise whenever the re-
ceiver is prohibited from responding to the sender.
Heuer & Penrod, Trial Lawyers in the Box?, THE DocKET, Fall 1989, at 4 (editor's note).
8. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 4 (editor's note); see also Landry, Let the Jurors Ask!,
Nat'l L.J., Jan. 29, 1990, at 13, col. 1; Nolan, Questions on Jury Questions Are Answered, Nat'l
L.J., Aug. 7, 1989, at 12, col. 2; Sherman, Wider Role for Jurors Is Studied, Nat'l L.J., July 10,
1989, at 3, col. 1; WiehI, supra note 1, at B5, col. 3; 60 Minutes: Trial by Jury (CBS television
broadcast, Apr. 23, 1989) (transcript available from Journal Graphics, Inc., 267 Broadway, New
York, NY 10007).
9. Note, The Questioning of Witnesses by Jurors, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 127, 129 (1977).
10. See Cleary, Evidence As a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REV. 277, 289 (1952);
see also Note, supra note 9, at 129-31.
11. In fact, juror communication with a lawyer during the course of the trial can constitute
sufficient grounds for a mistrial, and the court can hold the juror and the lawyer in contempt. The
decision is ultimately in the trial judge's discretion. The most significant problem with these con-
versations is that they arouse suspicion that undermines confidence in the validity of the verdict.
See Lindsey v. Watts, 273 Ark. 478, 621 S.W.2d 679 (1981); Cloutier v. Charland, 100 N.H. 63, 119
A.2d 96 (1955); Baker v. Ohio Ferro-Alloys Corp., 23 Ohio App. 2d 25, 261 N.E.2d 156 (Ct. App.
1970); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Black, 395 P.2d 416 (Okla. 1964); Printed Terry Finishing Co. v. City
of Lebanon, 247 Pa. Super. 277, 372 A.2d 460 (Super. Ct. 1977), rev'd, 264 Pa. Super. 192, 399 A.2d
732 (Super. Ct. 1979); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Futrell, 209 Va. 266, 163 S.E.2d 181
(1968). See generally 89 C.J.S. Trial § 457 (1955).
12. Ironically, from the first day of law school, a lawyer is trained to become adept at the
fundamentals of two-way communication through the Socratic teaching method.
13. See, e.g., Cleary, supra note 10, at 277; Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Com-
munication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 601.
14. Note, supra note 9, at 130-31.
15. Id.
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The implications of these findings have led academics and practi-
tioners to advocate procedures that allow jurors to question witnesses.'6
The proponents usually note that lawyers and judges find it virtually
impossible to evaluate juror comprehension.' 7 If the jury must remain
silent while the evidence is being presented, attorneys must rely on ob-
servations of the jurors' facial expressions and body language to discern
whether the jury is becoming confused or believes that information has
been omitted.' Admittedly, lawyers can, and will, omit information oc-
casionally for strategic or evidentiary reasons, but often information is
omitted inadvertently.' 9 Several commentators contend that this overall
lack of feedback forces the jury to resort to unnecessary or improper
speculation during deliberations or causes the group to focus on incor-
rect or tangential issues.20 These problems can hinder severely the
jury's ability to fulfill its fact-finding function.
Many critics agree that the inherent problems of one-way commu-
nication are legitimate concerns,2 but believe that the problems arising
from juror questioning far outweigh any potential advantages to the ju-
dicial system.2 2 A major concern is that juror questioning will compro-
mise the jurors' ability to remain impartial because they may become
too involved in the trial.24 Opponents of the process also contend that a
juror may ask an improper or prejudicial question2 5 since the vast ma-
jority of jurors are not trained in the law. 6 Additionally, critics have
argued that this practice puts attorneys in the impossible position of
having to decide between objecting to a juror question and alienating
16. See generally Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors' Partic-
ipation in Trials: A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 231 (1988); Note, supra note 9.
17. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 14; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237; Note, supra
note 9, at 130-31.
18. See generally R. FRANK, PASSIONS. WrrHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF EMOTIONS
(1988) (discussing how human emotions convey information).
19. Note, supra note 9, at 131 & n.20.
20. See id. at 131 & n.21 (citing additional sources).
21. See sources cited supra note 16.
22. See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 14; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 257-58;
Note, supra note 9, at 160.
23. See DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 1985). The
notion of jury impartiality is grounded in the Bill of Rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also
Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237.
24. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 4; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237.
25. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 4; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237. Lawyers and
judges, however, have been known to serve on juries. See P. DIPERNA, supra note 6, at 222. These
cases are extremely rare because many jurisdictions still automatically exempt lawyers and judges
from jury service. Id. In addition, even without an automatic exemption, trial lawyers may exercise
a challenge and remove a lawyer or judge from the panel. Thus, more often than not, lawyers or
judges serve on a jury only because the trial lawyers ran out of challenges.
26. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 4; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237.
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the jury 7 or not objecting and losing the right to appeal that issue.28
Other criticisms concern the anticipation of potential questions29 and
the impact of juror questions on courtroom decorum 0 and trial speed. 1
Although judges have allowed juror questioning of witnesses since
the early part of the twentieth century, 2 the practice is receiving wide-
spread attention only now. As a result, many judges still are deciding
whether to allow jurors to ask questions in their courtrooms and, if so,
under what circumstances. Others are debating what procedures to use
for soliciting questions and handling their admissibility. Furthermore,
because juror questioning of witnesses involves the issue of juror impar-
tiality, the subject eventually may reach the Supreme Court.3 3
This Note examines the empirical research on juror questioning,
with special emphasis on the differences between judicial and juror
questioning. Part II of this Note traces the historical development of
the American jury system. Part III describes the legal aspects of al-
lowing persons other than counsel to question witnesses. Part IV dis-
cusses the procedural aspects of allowing jurors to question witnesses
during a trial. Part V analyzes various arguments in favor of allowing
juror questioning and the empirical studies in this field. Finally, Part
VI evaluates the issue of juror questioning and concludes that although
juror questioning does reduce the problems associated with one-way
communication, the risks of the questioning process, including trial de-
lay and juror bias, outweigh most of the advantages offered by the pro-
cedure; therefore, the questioning process should cease.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN JURY
In the early days of the development of the jury system, jurors
played a more active role in the trial process.3 " Opinions about the ac-
tual origins of the modern jury system vary. 5 Some scholars attribute
27. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 4; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237.
28. See FED. R EVID. 103. Under the federal rules, attorneys must make timely objections to
preserve the right to appeal. In either situation, the attorney is faced with the possibility of a
malpractice suit at the conclusion of the trial if the client is dissatisfied with the result of the case.
Even if the malpractice suit is frivolous, the disgruntled client can file the case provided that the
client is willing to pay the filing fee and can find an attorney willing to handle the case.
29. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 5; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237. Concerns
about juror questions include unwanted surprise and destruction of attorney strategy.
30. See sources cited supra note 29.
31. See id.
32. See supra note 4.
33. See 60 Minutes: Trial by Jury, supra note 8.
34. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
35. See generally White, Origin and Development of Trial by Jury, 29 TENN. L. REv. 8, 14-15
(1961).
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the concept to the Athenians. 6 Others point to the continental Euro-
pean procedure of inquisition,3 7 a royal device designed to obtain relia-
ble information about imperial matters." In an inquisition the king
used his royal prerogative to force the most reputable men in an area to
appear before the court. 9 Presumably, these men would have knowl-
edge of the events in their community"° and would be the most truth-
ful. 41 Eventually, the right to invoke the royal prerogative was available
to the public on demand.42
The king chose these early jurors because of their knowledge of a
case's facts or their ability to discover the necessary facts.43 If the mem-
bers of the inquisition did not have personal knowledge of the case
when summoned, the case would be delayed for two weeks so that the
jurors could gather the necessary information to make a decision. 44 Be-
cause of their status in the community, the jurors were expected to be
36. See, e.g., J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 2 (1988). Around 400 B.C. the Athenians
created a system similar to the jury system. According to Aristotle, those citizens accused of
wrongdoing under Athenian law could argue their cases before a tribunal of their peers. The tribu-
nal was obligated to apply its understanding of "general justice," not to try to interpret the letter
of the law. Id.
Jury members were selected by lots. Jurors, or dicasts, were all males over the age of 30. A
criminal jury could have between 501 and 1501 members; a civil jury had 201 members. Odd num-
bers of members guaranteed a majority verdict. Judgments were final, but the loser did have the
right to press perjury charges. In criminal cases the sentence was carried out immediately after the
announcement of the verdict, and both the accuser and the defendant were at risk. Verdicts in civil
cases were treated differently. Bicause the jury had no enforcement power, a victor in civil matters
had to use any possible means to collect on a judgment. The jury system apparently died out when
the Romans captured the Athenian world except for the continued use of juries for capital cases in
Greece through the reign of Emperor Augustus. Id.
37. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD
1 140 (2d ed. 1898). Ninth century Frankish royalty developed the inquisition procedure. See J.
GUINTHER, supra note 36, at 7; Note, supra note 9, at 134-35.
38. J. GUINTHER, supra note 36, at 7; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 141;
Note, supra note 9, at 135.
39. See sources cited supra note 38.
40. Note, supra note 9, at 135 n.45.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 136. William the Conqueror and his fellow Norman advisors took the inquisition
process to England during the eleventh century. Note, supra note 9, at 135 & n.47 (citing other
sources); see also O'Connor, The Transition from Inquisition to Accusation, 8 CRIM. L.J. 351, 351
(1984). The right to use an inquisition remained with royalty until Henry II's reign in the twelfth
century, when, in an attempt to increase the popularity of the king's courts, Henry II extended the
royal prerogative to the public. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 144. The king, as a
favor or for a fee, would use his royal prerogative to summon citizens to resolve disputes among
private citizens. Note, supra note 9, at 136 (citing additional sources). The popularity of this pro-
cedure increased rapidly, and eventually the right to invoke the royal prerogative was granted as a
matter of right and was available on demand. Id.
43. Note, supra note 9, at 136. See generally McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 244, at 724-25 (E.
Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
44. Note, supra note 9, at 136-37; see 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 627.
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able to obtain the information.45
The jurors then would be required to swear to the truth of the mat-
ter.4' The members of the jury were free to gather the information any
way they could provided that they were able to recognize the truth in
court.47 Thus, jurors effectively served as witnesses. Yet, jury members
were not required to be eyewitnesses to the incident4 8 or to testify in
court.4 9 Calling witnesses into court did not become a common practice
until the latter part of the fifteenth century.50
Historians and commentators have been unable to determine ex-
actly why the jury system shifted from an extremely active form of par-
ticipation to a passive one.5' Some scholars have suggested that the
attaint procedure prompted the change.52 Under attaint a second jury
could put the first jury on trial for rendering an incorrect verdict .5 The
attaint process was extremely unpopular because the second jury could
enforce harsh penalties. 54 Many people also considered it unfair to con-
vict one jury simply because another jury disagreed with the decision,
especially when the second jury relied on different information than
that collected by the first jury.5 5 Many juries intentionally avoided
reaching a verdict out of fear that a second jury would disagree.5 6
Eventually, the unpopularity of the attaint process made obtaining
a conviction extremely difficult.57 Therefore, the judge, rather than a
second jury, began to determine the correctness of the initial jury ver-
45. Note, supra note 9, at 137.
46. Id.; see also 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 627.
47. Note, supra note 9, at 137.
48. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 628; Note, supra note 9, at 137.
49. Note, supra note 9, at 137; see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 244, at
724.
50. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 244, at 725.
51. Note, supra note 9, at 137. The only certainty is that the shift occurred gradually over
many years. Id. at 137 n.60 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 244, at 725); see also
J. GUINTHER, supra note 36, at 13-15.
52. E.g., Note, supra note 9, at 137.
53. Id.; see also J. GUINTHER, supra note 36, at 16.
54. J. GUINTHER, supra note 36, at 16. As Sir John Fortesque summarized in 1470:
All of the first jury shall be committed to the King's prison, their goods shall be confiscated,
their possessions seized into the King's hands, their habitations and houses shall be pulled
down, their woodland shall be felled, their meadows shall be plowed up and they themselves
forever thenceforward be esteemed in the eye of the law infamous.
Id.
55. Note, supra note 9, at 137.
56. J. GUINTHER, supra note 36, at 16. When a jury refused to reach a verdict the judge would
use everything in his power to force a verdict. Id. In some cases, judges refused the jurors food and
drink until they reached a verdict. Other judges would haul the jury around town in open tumbrils
in all kinds of weather to force a decision. Because a finding of guilty was what the judge or the
king usually wanted, the jurors were likely to return a guilty verdict under this type of not so
subtle coercion. Id.
57. Note, supra note 9, at 138.
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dict.58 To review the verdict, the judge needed to be familiar with the
facts that the jury members had used to reach their verdict.59 Gradu-
ally, the modern procedure emerged by which jury members only may
consider information presented to them in the courtroom. 0 This proce-
dural shift naturally resulted in precluding jurors from asking questions
outside the courtroom. 1 Yet, no logical connection exists between pre-
cluding jury members from searching for evidence outside the court-
room and the decline of juror questioning inside the courtroom. 2
III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE JUDGE AND THE JURY QUESTIONING
WITNESSES
The modern Anglo-American judicial system places the primary re-
sponsibility for eliciting the facts and issues in a case on the parties
presenting the evidence.6 3 As a result, this process has inherent limita-
tions stemming primarily from the nature of the adversarial process,
which gives the attorneys a strong incentive to slant the evidence in
their favor. The adversarial system also creates an incentive for lawyers
to omit important, but potentially damaging, pieces of evidence in the
hope that their opponents also will fail to elicit the information."
A. The Judge
To facilitate the ultimate goal of discovering the truth, a judge is
allowed to question, 5 and even call," new witnesses to clarify testimony
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The members of the jury also are precluded from considering outside information
that they might have learned prior to the trial. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. In the seventeenth century, the jury system was brought to America because the colo-
nists realized that it was a basic protection of their liberty. Id. Later, the right to a trial by jury
was guarantee&in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 3; U.S.
CONST. amends. VI, VII.
Several commentators have noted that this respect for the jury system and the implicit trust
that the system was functioning properly have resulted in a scarcity of detailed documentation on
the performance and function of the American system until the late 1800s. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 9, at 139 & nn.74-75 and materials cited therein. In turn, no evidence on why the American
jury shifted from an active to a passive entity exists. Id. at 139. Thus, no historical reason for
prohibiting juror questioning inside the courtroom can be cited.
63. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 8, at 14-15.
64. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 147-48.
65. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, "A party is privileged from producing the evi-
dence but not from its production." Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913). In other
words, a party is not required to produce relevant evidence, but the party may not prevent the
opposing party from introducing the evidence. See Note, Questions to Witnesses and Notetaking
by the Jury As Aids to Understanding Complex Litigation, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 687, 701 (1983)
(citing Holmes's famous statement in Johnson and other similar cases).
A judge's right to question a witness has been codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 614, which
[Vol. 44:117
1991] JURORS QUESTIONING WITNESSES 125
or bring out needed facts that the parties have not elicited. The right to
question a witness is completely at the judge's discretion. 7 Failure to
exercise this right, which many courts have deemed an affirmative
duty,68 apparently has not led to any reversals on the appellate court
level.69
A judge's right to question a witness, however, is not absolute.70 In
reads as follows:
(a) Calling by court. The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call
witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called.
(b) Interrogation by court. The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by
a party,
(c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to interrogation by it may
be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is not present.
FED. R. EVID. 614. The.Advisory Committee has noted that "the judge is not imprisoned within the
case as made by the parties." Id. 614(a) advisory committee's note; see also Griffin v. United
States, 164 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 857 (1948); People v. MaGee, 217 Cal.
App. 2d 443, 31 Cal. Rptr. 658 (Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 925 (1964); State v. Keehn,
85 Kan. 765, 118 P. 851 (1911); McLaughlin v. Municipal Court, 308 Mass. 397, 32 N.E.2d 266
(1941); State v. Riley, 28 N.J. 188, 145 A.2d 601 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 313 (1959); State v.
Kirby, 273 N.C. 306, 160 S.E.2d 24 (1968). See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 43,
§ 8, at 14-17.
66. See FED. 1R EVID. 614(a); see also United States v. Agajanian, 852 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1988);
Main Water & Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 171 Cal. 706, 714, 154 P. 864, 867 (1916) (stating
that the commission, as a judicial tribunal, may call witnesses); Merchants Bank v. Goodfellow, 44
Utah 349, 353, 140 P. 759, 761 (1914) (allowing the trial court to call last endorser in suit on bill of
exchange). See generally United States v. 141st Sheet Corp., 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990); Johnson
v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1990); Hanson v. Walker, 888 F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1989);
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 8, at 14-17.
67. People v. Palmer, 27 Ill. 2d 311, 189 N.E.2d 265 (1963) (stating that the circumstances of
each case must determine the limits of the court's discretion).
68. E.g., Grant v. United States, 407 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating that a federal trial judge
has not only the right, but also the duty to participate in examination of witnesses in a criminal
trial to bring out matters insufficiently developed by counsel); United States v. Ostendorff, 371
F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982 (1967); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d
583 (2d Cir. 1952) (citing Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir.) (stating that "the
function of a federal trial judge is ... to see that justice is done in the cases heard before him; and
... to see that a case on trial is presented in such a way as to be understood by the jury, as well as
by himself"), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694 (1941)); Pariser v. City of New York, 146 F.2d 431 (2d Cir.
1945) (stating that a judge who conducts a jury trial has a duty to see that the facts are presented
clearly). Courts never have held that a defendant has a constitutional right to a confused trial. See
United States v. Fluellen, 396 F. Supp. 1168 (D.C. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 530 F.2d 965 (3d Cir.
1976). But see United States v. Carengelia, 198 F.2d 3 (7th Cir.) (holding that a judge does not
have the duty to caution or advise the prosecuting attorney to correct some deficiency in the gov-
ernment's proof), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 881 (1952).
69. Federal Rule of Evidence 614(b) indicates that a judge may interrogate witnesses. See
supra note 65. In United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit noted
that the trial judge did not have a duty to question witnesses even though the defendant appeared
without counsel. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Smith v. Povich, 568 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1978);
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 8, at 15. But cf. Note, supra note 9, at 140-41 & n.80
(discussing United States v. Ostendorfl). In Ostendorff the Fourth Circuit held that a judge has a
duty to bring out matters insufficiently developed by counsel. Ostendorff, 371 F.2d at 732.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that when judi-
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the vast majority of states, a judge does not have the power to comment
on the weight of the evidence and, as a result, must avoid making any
implied comments."' If a judge asks a question suggesting the desired
answer, the jury may infer that the question constitutes what the judge
believes to be the truth.7 2 Because of the impartial nature of the judi-
cial position, however, a judge is not subject to the same rules prohibit-
ing leading questions that govern attorneys. 3
The federal courts and the courts of those states that have retained
the common-law power to comment7 4 have relaxed many restrictions on
leading and impeaching questions. 5 Yet, the judge still must be careful
not to appear to be an advocate or a prosecutor.7 6 Numerous questions
cial questions are designed to elicit answers favorable to the prosecution, it is better for the trial
court to err on the side of abstention); Kramer v. United States, 408 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969)
(stating that a judge may ask questions and has the prerogative to comment directly on witnesses
and their testimony, but a judge oversteps the bounds of propriety by becoming an advocate for
one party); Texas Pac.-Mo. Pac. Terminal R.R. v. Welsh, 179 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1950) (stating that
for a trial judge to maintain the required impartiality, the judge should monitor not only the num-
ber and type of questions, but also the manner in which they are propounded); Pariser, 146 F.2d at
431 (stating that judges can ask questions to fulfill their duty to ensure that evidence is presented
clearly, but they should exercise self-restraint and preserve the atmosphere of impartiality); State
v. Betsellie, 82 N.M. 782, 487 P.2d 484 (1971) (stating that the trial judge is more than a mere
umpire or moderator and may propound questions to witnesses if the questions are within the
bounds demanded by the trial judge position and if the judge displays no bias for or against either
litigant).
71. People v. Gaston, 85 Ill. App. 2d 403, 229 N.E.2d 404 (App. Ct. 1967) (holding that the
trial court's interruption of witnesses' testimony to clarify points was not error because the judge
did not impugn the credibility of the witnesses or assume the role of an advocate); see also State v.
Pokini, 55 Haw. 640, 526 P.2d 94 (1974) (stating that while it is within the discretion of the trial
judge to examine witnesses to bring out needed facts not elicited by the parties, this discretion is
circumscribed by the responsibility not to assume the role of an advocate or a prosecutor). See
generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 8, at 15.
72. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 8, at 15 (citing People v. De Lordo, 350 IlM.
148, 182 N.E. 726 (1932); Risley v. Moberg, 69 Wash. 2d 560, 419 P.2d 151 (1966)).
73. Attorneys are prohibited from asking leading questions on direct examination. FED. R.
EVID. 611(c). The exceptions to this general rule include a hostile witness, a child witness, a witness
whose recollection is exhausted, and undisputed preliminary matters. Id. advisory committee's
note.
Several prominent authorities have questioned the logic of distinguishing between leading
questions asked by a judge and those asked by attorneys. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 43,
§ 8, at 15-16 (citing a remark in Commonwealth v. Berklowitz, 133 Pa. Super. 190, 2 A.2d 516
(Super. Ct. 1938)). These authorities have been concerned particularly with questions aimed at
discrediting or impeaching the witness. Although these questions would be proper if asked by an
attorney attempting to impeach a witness, when asked by a judge the questions may be perceived
improperly as comments on the weight of the testimony. Id.
74. The power to comment on the weight of the evidence is not unbounded. Although it gives
judges greater latitude in questioning witnesses, they still are precluded from acting as advocates
or prosecutors. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 8, at 16.
75. Id. These restrictions also are loosened in trials that are conducted without a jury. Id.
76. United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Victoria, 837
F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1988): United States v. Vega, 589 F.2d 1147, 1153 (2d Cir. 1978); Beetler v.
Sales Affiliates, Inc., 431 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1970) (stating that a judge may question a witness in
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and questions that are partisan in nature are the most likely indications




The Federal Rules of Evidence are silent on the question of jurors
asking questions, neither explicitly allowing nor disallowing the prac-
tice.78 The only guidance that a federal judge receives from the rules of
evidence is the admonition in Rule 611(a) that the court should exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses. 9
The federal courts that have considered the issue have concluded that
the practice is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge.80
Some courts even have noted that juror questions are neither anal-
ogous nor comparable to questioning of witnesses by a judge."1 All of
these courts have emphasized that a judge is present in the courtroom
to see that justice is done. 2 Furthermore, in a jury trial, the judge's
legal neutrality is not as important as the jury's since the jury makes
the ultimate factual decisions.83 Even if the judge did make these deci-
sions, a judge could remain legally neutral more easily than the jury
members because of the judge's legal training.8 '
an impartial manner); Kramer v. United States, 408 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969) (noting that a federal
judge may ask questions and only when the judge becomes an advocate for one party or the other
does the judge overstep the bounds of propriety in directing and governing the trial).
77. McCoRMICK ON EviDENCE, supra note 43, § 8, at 16. In United States v. Brandt, 196 F.2d
653 (2d Cir. 1952), the defendant's conviction was set aside after the judge asked more than 900
questions during an eight day trial. Id.; see also United States v. Fry, 304 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1962)
(observing that the judge asked over 1200 questions). To be successful on appeal, however, the
appellant should focus on the nature of the questions rather than on the total number of questions
asked by the judge. See, e.g., Texas Pac., 179 F.2d at 680 (noting that to maintain the impartiality
which proper trial technique demands, a trial judge, when asking questions, should be careful not
only about the number and type of questions asked, but also about the manner in which they are
asked).
78. See DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 515 (4th Cir. 1985).
79. FED. R Evm. 611(a).
80. See, e.g., DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 515; United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 &
n.2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979); United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 887 (1954).
81. See United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707, 711-15 (8th Cir. 1989) (Lay, C.J., joined by
McMillian, J., concurring); DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 516.
82. Id. (citing United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 594 (2d Cir.) (quoting Simon v.
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2. State Courts
On the state court level, only Georgia has concluded that it is inap-
propriate for jury members to ask questions under any circumstances. 5
The Georgia courts have not explained fully their reasons for refusing
to allow jurors to ask questions." The most extensive discussion is in
State v. Williamson17 in which the Georgia Supreme Court, using argu-
ments that also have been used in several federal cases,88 found that
because the practice of jurors directly questioning witnesses is danger-
ous, it is prohibited.8 9 The court noted that jurors are not schooled in
the rules of evidence that govern the presentation of evidence in the
trial and that jurors are likely to be offended personally if attorneys
object to juror questions.90
In all other state jurisdictions, juror questioning generally is con-
sidered proper. The states that allow juror questioning fall into two ba-
sic categories: those that allow questions, but discourage them, and
those that allow questions and actively encourage them.
The major concern for states that discourage questions is that a
juror's question might bring incompetent or prejudicial evidence to the
attention of the entire jury.91 These courts also are concerned that the
attorneys in the case might hesitate to object to inappropriate
questions.92
85. See Matchett v. State, 257 Ga. 785, 786, 364 S.E.2d 565, 566-57 (1988) (stating that juror
questions generally are not permitted); State v. Williamson, 247 Ga. 685, 686, 279 S.E.2d 203, 204
(1981); Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 536, 260 S.E.2d 407, 410 (Ct. App. 1979) (noting that a
juror should not be permitted to examine a witness under any circumstances).
86. In Matchett the court simply stated that the process of allowing jurors to ask questions
during trials was "generally not permitted in this state." Matchett, 257 Ga. at 786, 364 S.E.2d at
567 (citing Williamson, 247 Ga. at 686, 279 S.E.2d at 204). In Stinson an equally short explanation
was given. Stinson, 151 Ga. App. at 536, 260 S.E.2d at 410 (stating that "a juror should not be
permitted to examine a witness under any circumstances").
87. 247 Ga. at 685, 279 S.E.2d at 203.
88. See generally DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 516-17 (discussing the various arguments).
89. Williamson, 247 Ga. at 686, 279 S.E.2d at 204.
90. Id. If questions are asked, however, the Georgia courts will determine whether the error
was harmless. Cf. Stinson, 151 Ga. App. at 536, 260 S.E.2d at 410 (stating that even if jurors are
allowed to question a witness, they have "no more right to ask an improper question than do the
parties or their counsel"). In addition, failure to object to the first round of juror questioning can
lead to a waiver of the right to prevent juror questioning. See Matchett, 257 Ga. at 786, 364 S.E.2d
at 567.
91. See Smith v. State, 81 Okla. Crim. 412, 419, 165 P.2d 381, 385 (Crim. App. 1946), rev'd,
83 Okla. Crim. 392, 177 P.2d 523 (Crim. App. 1947); see also Raynor v. State, 1 Tenn. Crim. App.
556, 561-62, 447 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Crim. App. 1969) (stating that the efforts of jurors to ask ques-
tions of witnesses during trial often present delicate problems and should not be encouraged);
Branch v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 164, 469 S.W.2d 533 (Crim. App. 1969).
92. See, e.g., State v. Jeffries, 644 S.W.2d 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); Raynor, 1 Tenn.
Crim. App. at 566, 447 S.W.2d at 391; white v. Little, 131 Okla. 132, 134, 268 P. 221, 222 (1928).
The courts that discuss the subject note that failing to object is an obvious sign of an incompetent
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The states that actively encourage the practice believe that juror
questioning will enable the jury to obtain a better understanding of the
facts and issues before it." By implication, these states must have re-
jected the notion that trial lawyers should slant the case in favor of
their clients as best they can without resorting to outright falsification
of the facts and that the adversarial process itself will cause the jury to
reach the correct verdict. 4 Thus, in Louisville Bridge & Terminal Co.
v. Brown 95 the Kentucky Supreme Court approved the practice of ju-
rors asking questions of witnesses. 6 The court noted that the practice
aided the jury's ability to discover and analyze the facts of the case and
to reach a proper verdict.9 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court, in
State v. Kendall,98 stated that as long as the questioning was not im-
proper and was designed to discover the truth, it should be allowed. 9
Furthermore, the court noted that jurors often asked pertinent and
helpful questions that furthered the discovery of the truth.100
The Kendall court's belief that juror questions always are perti-
nent and helpful is probably an exaggeration. Most empirical studies
have found that juror questions are more helpful in eliminating a ju-
ror's dissatisfaction with the trial process than in discovering intention-
ally concealed or previously unconsidered facts.101 The states that
discourage, but do not prohibit, the practice of juror questioning, prob-
ably made this assumption before researchers began empirical studies
in this area.
Although much disagreement concerning the appropriateness of ju-
ror questions exists, courts do agree on several factors. First, if a juror is
allowed to ask questions, the questions must be appropriate and must
not violate the rules of evidence.10 2 In addition, a trial judge cannot
attorney. These courts contend that the practice of allowing jurors to ask questions when an attor-
ney is afraid to object is so dangerous to the rights of the litigant that they will not encourage the
practice of allowing jurors to ask questions. Id.
93. Annotation, supra note 5, at 880.
94. See Wheeler, The Second Circuit Review, 41 BROoKLYN L. REv. 841, 864-65 (1985). See
generally Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45 (1991).
95. 211 Ky. 176, 277 S.W. 320 (1925).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 183, 277 S.W. at 322.
98. 143 N.C. 659, 57 S.E. 340 (1907).
99. Id. at 662-63, 57 S.E. at 341.
loo. Id.
101. E.g., Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 10; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237; Sand
& Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in the Second
Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. RE.v 441-46 (1985) (noting the value of increased juror attentiveness, but
failing to list the discovery of concealed information or previously unconsidered facts as a benefit).
See generally infra Part V.
102. See Sparks v. Daniels, 343 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (stating that if jurors
1991]
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compel a defendant to take the stand and testify through interrogation
by the jury.103 Although a court's refusal to allow a juror to ask a ques-
tion is not error, 104 a court cannot issue a preliminary instruction that
completely precludes jury questioning throughout the trial.0 5 Finally,
appellate courts will not reverse a verdict in a case solely on the basis of
an improper juror question unless the error caused irreparable
prejudice to the appellant. 06
IV. THE PROCEDURAL PROCESS OF ALLOWING JURORS TO ASK
QUESTIONS DURING TRIAL
If a judge decides to allow jury members to ask questions during a
trial, a number of procedural issues must be settled. First, the judge
must consider whether to use a preliminary instruction that actively en-
courages jurors to ask questions. Second, the judge must decide how
questions will be presented. The judge can allow the juror to ask the
witness questions directly. Alternatively, the jury member could present
questions to the judge orally during, or immediately after, the witness's
testimony. If the attorneys wish to object to the question they would
object in front of the jury.07 As another option, a juror could write out
questions and present them to the judge; attorneys would object in the
absence of the jury. The judge also must decide whether the jurors
should be allowed to ask questions that extend beyond the scope of di-
rect and cross-examination.
are given permission to ask questions, the court must ensure that no improper questions are
asked); see also Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 536, 260 S.E.2d 407, 410 (Ct. App. 1979).
103. United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1300
(1990). In another case, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a defense attorney acted improp-
erly by inviting jury members to ask questions of the defendant witness when no juror had voiced
a need for clarification of any issue or testimony. Lucas v. State, 381 So. 2d 140 (Miss. 1980).
104. See People v. Wesley, 148 Mich. App. 758, 384 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 428
Mich. 708, 411 N.W.2d 159, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 967 (1987); State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App.
345, 128 N.E.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1955), afl'd, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 352 U.S.
910 (1956).
105. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 250 Ind. 13, 234 N.E.2d 650 (1968).
106. See, e.g., People v. McAlister, 167 Cal. App. 3d 633, 213 Cal. Rptr. 271 (Ct. App. 1985).
Although Georgia courts have stated that they do not permit juror questions under any circum-
stances, if a juror does ask a question and the trial judge allows the question, reversible error is not
automatic. Stinson, 151 Ga. App. at 536, 260 S.E.2d at 410.
107. Conceivably, the judge could ask the jury to leave the courtroom immediately after a
question was raised to determine the propriety of the question being asked. This option, however,




If a judge intends to allow and encourage members of a jury to ask
questions during the trial, the judge should make an affirmative effort
to notify the jurors of the availability of the procedure, although most
jurisdictions do not require this action.108 Because traditionally jurors
have not questioned witnesses during trial, the vast majority of the
American public may be unaware that jurors are allowed to question
witnesses during a trial. Juror questioning of witnesses cannot remedy
the problems associated with one-way communication if jurors remain
ignorant of their right to question witnesses. The judge also should in-
form the jurors of both the duties and limitations associated with this
ability °9 and the court-selected procedures for eliciting questions. 011
Judges may use two basic methods to inform the jury members of
the option of asking questions. The first method is a jury handbook,
which would be issued to all prospective jurors."' The second method is
an oral instruction, which would be read after the opening statements
of counsel, but before the first witness was sworn."' With either
method, the judge should inform the jurors of the opportunity to ques-
tion the witnesses under procedures and times designated by the
court,"' and that counsel has the primary responsibility for presenting
evidence. 1 4 The judge also should tell the jurors to use the procedure
sparingly and only if they believe that their questions will not, or can-
not, be answered by a subsequent witness." 5
In further instructions the court should advise the jurors, either in
oral or written form, that in some circumstances the judge will be una-
ble to ask questions submitted by the jurors." 6 The court should ex-
plain that if a question cannot be asked, the jurors should not be
offended, nor should they attribute the decision not to ask a question to
an objection by any party in the case."17 The pattern instruction should
state that the judge's decision on whether the question can be used has
108. See People v. Justice, 50 Mich. App. 55, 57, 212 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Ct. App. 1973) (noting
that the court is not required to sua sponte instruct the jurors that they can question a witness).
109. Note, supra note 9, at 149-50 & n.137.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 149-50; Annotation, supra note 3, at 876-77.
112. See Sand & Reiss, supra note 101, at 477; see also Note, supra note 9, at 149-50; Anno-
tation, supra note 5, at 876-77.
113. At this point, the judge should describe to the members of the jury the procedure for
juror questioning that has been selected for use in that courtroom.
114. Sand & Reiss, supra note 101, at 477.
115. Id. The jury, however, has a difficult task in forecasting whether a certain question will






nothing to do with the quality of the question, n 8 but is based on techni-
cal rules of evidence, which must be followed in the courtroom.11 9 Fi-
nally, the judge should inform the jurors that the judge might refuse to
ask the question because a subsequent witness will address the
information.'20
Neither method of conveying this information to the jurors is per-
fect. Although jury handbooks have been an accepted form of jury ori-
entation for more than a quarter of a century,1 21 jurors may not read
the handbook. At the same time, oral instructions can be too long and
complicated and, therefore, difficult to understand and remember.
122
Additionally, if a juror is not paying attention during oral instructions,
the juror may fail to utilize the procedure or may use it improperly.
Thus, the judge should use a combination of these two procedures to
inform the members of the jury properly. To be effective, both oral and
written instructions must be short and to the point.
B. Procedures
The most important decision for the judge who will use jury ques-
tioning is choosing the procedure that the judge will employ to solicit
questions from jurors during trial. Because virtually all jurors are lay
persons, the judge must design a procedure that lessens the possibility
of a reversal on appeal, but heightens the flexibility of the questioning
process.lsa
118. Id.
119. Id. In the typical instruction, the judge also should mention that the rules of evidence
are complicated and that lay persons are not expected'to know them. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Note, supra note 9, at 150 & n.138.
122. Even a relatively simple instruction can be ineffective if given in conjunction with sev-
eral other instructiois. Cf., e.g., Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM L. REv. 1306 (1979) (discussing the "plain
English" movement in the context of jury instructions); Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial
Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 601, 614-15; Robinson, Causing the Condition of One's Own
Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 52 (1985);
Steele & Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C.L. REv. 77,
77-78 (1988). Although these articles deal primarily with the problems of jury instructions at the
end of a trial, their conclusions apply by analogy to instructions at the beginning of a trial.
123. Conceivably, a judge could decrease the risk of reversal on appeal to zero by using a
strict screening procedure to enhance thorough consideration of the implications of a juror's ques-
tion to a witness. By eliminating the risk of reversal entirely, however, the judge would add a
significant amount of time to the trial process. Alternatively, the judge could ignore the risks of a
reversal on appeal and allow the members of the jury wide latitude in the questioning process.
This option certainly would lead to a shorter trial than use of a strict screening procedure; how-




1. Timing of Juror Questions
The obvious starting place is the timing of juror questions. The
judge has several options regarding when to allow questions. The judge
could allow questions at any time, at the end of the witness's testimony,
or at the end of the trial. The first option, allowing jurors to ask ques-
tions at any time, would increase the effectiveness of juror questioning.
This advantage is outweighed, however, by the disruptions in counsel's
line of questioning, particularly when counsel wants to enhance the
jury's ability to comprehend the information by eliciting testimony in a
deliberate order.2 Under the third option, in which questions are
delayed until the end of the trial, the jury may have difficulty linking
the answer to the jurors' questions with the remainder of the witness's
testimony. The advantages of allowing jurors to ask questions would be
frustrated unnecessarily.12 5 This method also could become extremely
expensive for the parties in the case, especially if an expert witness had
to remain in the courtroom for additional hours or days to answer juror
questions. Thus, in most situations the judge utilizes the second timing
option and holds questions until after the witness has finished testify-
ing, but before the witness is dismissed.126 If the jury members are al-
lowed to take notes, 27 many of the problems with delay could be
eliminated.
In several situations a judge should allow jurors to question a wit-
ness immediately. The most obvious example is during the testimony of
an expert witness. If the jurors are unable to comprehend the basic in-
formation that an expert presents at the beginning of the testimony,
subsequent testimony will have little value for the jury.2 8 If the judge
is concerned with unwieldy juror questioning, the judge could instruct
the jurors to ask only definitional questions during the witness's testi-
124. See generally Note, supra note 65, at 705.
125. Id.
126. Waiting until a witness has completed testimony is the most popular method of ques-
tioning since it serves to eliminate many of the potentially irrelevant and tangential questions that
a juror might have thought of during the witness's testimony. Id.
127. Id. Allowing jurors to take notes is also an extremely controversial subject because of
fears that jurors will spend too much time taking notes on irrelevant lines of testimony and miss
important pieces of information. Id. at 710. A concern that they will record incorrect information
also exists. See id. A New York state court recently ruled that juror note taking was inappropriate
in a case in which the trial judge had allowed two jury members to take notes during a supplemen-
tal jury charge. See People v. Morales, 159 A.D.2d 86, 559 N.Y.S.2d 869 (App. Div. 1990). The
court feared that the jurors would place great weight on their notes, which could be inaccurate or
misleading. Id. The Morales court did not address the issue of juror note taking during the presen-
tation of evidence. See generally Sand & Reiss, supra note 101, at 477; Note, supra note 65, at 687.
128. See Ratton v. Busby, 230 Ark. 667, 326 S.W.2d 889 (1959) (noting that members of the
jury asked 45 questions about the technical nature and structure of an airplane). See generally
Note, supra note 9, at 155.
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mony and allow them to ask other questions at the conclusion of the
expert's testimony. The judge also could collect the jurors' questions
periodically during the testimony rather than waiting until the testi-
mony is completed.
129
2. Direct Questioning of Witnesses by Jurors
After addressing the timing of questions, the court must choose be-
tween direct and indirect questioning. Direct questioning of witnesses
encourages maximum juror participation.130 Because the jurors are ask-
ing the questions themselves, they become involved actively in the two-
way communication process. 31 Under this system if the juror is unsatis-
fied with an answer, the juror can seek clarification. Studies have shown
that distortion of information is lessened when questions and answers
are integrated.13 2 Any increases in trial time can be reduced because
most of the delays relating to juror questioning come from any initial
screening procedure.
1 33
The drawbacks of direct questioning probably outweigh the advan-
tages. Most significantly, the risk that an improper question will be
asked increases dramatically for several reasons. First, by objecting in
front of the jurors, attorneys risk antagonizing them. 3 Many attorneys
have said that they wish to avoid this situation and sometimes would be
reluctant to raise an objection.' The attorney who fails to object, in
most jurisdictions, would be barred from arguing on appeal that the
juror's line of questioning was improper.3 8
129. Naturally, these procedures could be utilized for any type of witness.
130. Note, supra note 9, at 152.
131. This involvement is particularly important when an expert witness is testifying and the
members of the jury must learn about a new subject. If they are forced to use an indirect method
of questioning, jurors may not comprehend the testimony because the witness has failed to discuss,
or the members of the jury have failed to comprehend, the initial pieces of information that facili-
tate understanding of the important and more complex aspects of the witneis's testimony. See id.
at 152-53. For a discussion of the indirect questioning method, see infra notes 146-67 and accom-
panying text.
132. Note, supra note 9, at 152 n.144. The other methods of questioning discussed infra
obviously can accommodate any follow-up questions that the juror may wish to raise, but the abil-
ity to raise these questions immediately is lost.
133. See infra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
134. See Annotation, supra note 5, at 878.
135. In informal conversations, many attorneys in the Nashville area told the Author of this
Note that they did not wish to be placed in a situation in which they might antagonize a jury
member. Therefore, the attorneys noted that they might be reluctant to raise an objection. The
Author's informal notes from these conversations are on file with Vanderbilt Law Review [herein-
after Informal Notesi.
136. See FED. R. EviD. 103. The only exception would be situations in which the line of ques-
tioning was clearly plain error. See United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17, 19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 243 (1989).
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Commentators and courts have proposed two solutions to these
problems, but both have serious flaws. Some courts have held that the
judge has an affirmative duty to rule on the impropriety of a question if
the attorneys fail to object. 137 The judge, however, risks violating the
prohibition against acting as an advocate. Some commentators suggest
that the judge use a procedure similar to the one provided in Rule
614(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding objections to ques-
tions asked by the trial judge."'8 Under Rule 614(c), objections to thie
judge's questions of witnesses "may be made at the time or at the next
available opportunity when the jury is not present."13 9 The rule is
designed to lessen the chance of embarrassment to counsel and possible
prejudice incurred from objecting in front of jurors, while simultane-
ously assuring that objections are made in time to take corrective
measures.
1 40
This second suggestion has potential problems with retroactivity
and juror bias. It gives attorneys the opportunity to object to a juror's
question after learning that the juror has discovered some extremely
damaging evidence. If the attorney waits until the next recess to object,
the question already will have been asked and answered,1 41 and the
damage done. If the judge decides that a remedial measure. is necessary,
the jurors quickly will discover that the juror's question caused a prob-
lem, and the jurors may be able to discern which attorney objected,
thereby eliminating any advantages that might have been gained by the
attorney's attempt to invoke Rule 614(c). The problem is compounded
further by the questionable effectiveness of remedial instructions. 142
Even if an objection is raised and sustained in the presence of the
jury, several problems remain. The witness may attempt to answer the
question despite the objection. Although the witness could be held in
contempt of court and the judge could instruct the jury to disregard the
witness's answer, remedial measures may be ineffective and, in fact,
may make the questioning juror feel uncomfortable or angry at being
thwarted by rules of evidence that the juror does not understand.1 43
In addition, many jurisdictions do not allow members of the jury to
137. State v. Crawford, 96 Minn. 95, 104 N.W. 822 (1905); Sparks v. Daniels, 343 S.W.2d 661
(Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
138. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 160.
139. FED. R. Evw. 614(c).
140. See id. advisory committee's note.
141. The attorney, of course, could ask for a side-bar conference immediately after the ques-
tion has been asked and request that the jury be excused so that the attorney could argue over the
propriety of the question. The jury quickly would see through this ruse.





discuss the case with anyone until deliberations have begun.14 4 Al-
though asking questions may not rise to the level of jury members be-
ginning deliberations before the end of the trial, the spirit of the
prohibition against beginning deliberations may be violated, and as a
result, the jury may develop a particular opinion about a line of ques-
tioning.145 If this process begins to happen, the jurors may lose their
impartiality and reach a decision prematurely-before the parties have
an opportunity to present their case.
3. Indirect Questioning with Judicial Screening
Many of the judges who use juror questioning choose the indirect
method because of a perceived potential for lack of control with direct
questioning.146 The judge can implement indirect questioning in either
of two ways.
a. Oral Questions
One technique requires jurors to direct their questions to the judge
orally. The judge, having instructed the witness previously to refrain
from answering any questions posed by a juror until after a ruling on
the propriety of the question, considers any objections raised by the
attorneys147 during a side-bar conference out of the jury's hearing. 4 8
This precaution would reduce, though not completely eliminate, the
risk that the attorneys will antagonize the jurors. If the question is
found to be impermissible, the judge either simply refuses to ask the
question or briefly explains the decision to the jury. 49 If the question is
144. See City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church, 1 Cal. App. 3d 384, 82 Cal. Rptr. 1
(Ct. App. 1969); Smith v. Brown, 102 Cal. App. 477, 283 P. 132 (Ct. App. 1929); State v. Washing-
ton, 182 Conn. 419, 438 A.2d 1144 (1980); Glasgow Realty Co. v. Metcalfe, 482 S.W.2d 750 (Ky.
1972); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Gregory, 387 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1965). This prohibition
generally extends to any situation in which the jury members are not functioning as a jury. Cloudt
v. Hutcherson, 175 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). The decision on whether to declare a mistrial
is, of course, within the discretion of the judge. The conversations of jurors probably would have to
occur several times and rise to the level at which the prejudice outweighs the jury's ability to reach
a fair verdict. See Wilson v. California Cab Co., 125 Cal. App. 383, 13 P.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1932)
(holding that discussions concerning a map which had been introduced into evidence were not
sufficiently prejudicial to be grounds for a mistrial); Higgins v. Dean Gas Engine & Foundry Co.,
140 Ky. 44, 130 S.W. 800 (1910) (holding that one juror expressing an opinion about the evidence
to another juror was not sufficiently prejudicial to be grounds for a mistrial).
145. See DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 516-17; see also Land, 877 F.2d at 19.
146. See, e.g., Land, 877 F.2d at 19; United States v. Polowichaly, 783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir.
1986); DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 515-17. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 156.
147. See Nelson v. State, 257 Ark. 1, 513 S.W.2d 496 (1974).
148. Without this side-bar conference, the attorney who wishes to object would have to ob-
ject in open court, thereby eliminating many of the advantages of the indirect questioning method.
See Note, supra note 65, at 707.
149. Id. A short, nontechnical explanation would be preferable because it might prevent the
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deemed permissible, then the question remains as asked or the judge
rephrases the question to avoid problems with form. 150 The judge also
has the option of instructing the attorneys to discuss the matter.'51 Ad-
ditionally, the judge should allow the attorneys to conduct another
round of examination to clarify any issues raised by the jurors'
questions.
1 52
Although this type of indirect questioning eliminates virtually all of
the problems associated with direct questioning of witnesses by the
jury, this method is not perfect. The questions themselves might be so
prejudicial that the judge must declare a mistrial because the jurors
have heard the question. For example, the prejudice problem arises if a
jury member asked questions relating to insurance coverage 5 ' or the
defendant's failure to testify.1 54 The problem would be exacerbated if
the witness ignored the judge's instruction and answered the question.
The seriousness of this problem depends on the effectiveness of a reme-
dial instruction. 55
b. Written Questions
The other method of indirect questioning requires jurors to write
down questions arising during a witness's testimony.15 After the wit-
ness has finished testifying, but before dismissal, the bailiff collects the
questions and presents them to the judge. 57 The judge then screens the
jurors from trying to guess the reason that the question was not asked. In turn, this measure
should reduce the possibility that the jury will return an incorrect verdict.
150. Note, supra note 9, at 153; see also Steckler, Management of the Jury, 28 F.R.D. 190,
196-97 (1961). Naturally, the judge can ask follow-up questions as long as the judge does not vio-
late the restrictions on the judiciary's right to ask questions. See supra notes 65-77 and accompa-
nying text.
151. Note, supra note 9, at 153.
152. Note, supra note 65, at 705.
153. The Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit questions concerning insurance coverage asked
for the purpose of establishing whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. See
FED. R. EVID. 411.
154. In criminal cases, the fifth amendment protects the defendant's right to refuse to tes-
tify. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
155. In Maggart v. Bell, 116 Cal. App. 306, 2 P.2d 516 (Ct. App. 1931), the appellate court
held that a juror's question regarding whether the defendant had accident insurance was harmless
because the trial judge ordered the witness not to answer the question and immediately admon-
ished the jury to disregard the question. Id. In Espinoza v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 237, 165 S.W. 208
(Crim. App. 1914), no reversible error resulted when the court informed the jury that they could
not consider the question of why the defendant did not testify. Id. Other courts, though, have
questioned the effectiveness of a remedial instruction and have noted that in certain situations a
judge would have no other choice but to declare a mistrial. See, e.g., DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 512.
156. See People v. Gates, 97 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 10, 158 Cal. Rptr. 759 (App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1979); State v. Barrett, 278 S.C. 414, 297 S.E.2d 794 (1982).
157. State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P.2d 102 (1958) (suggesting that juror questions
should be revealed privately to the judge).
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questions in chambers in the presence of attorneys for both parties.158
After each side has an opportunity to object to a question, the judge
makes a ruling.15 9 The entire procedure is conducted in the presence of
the court reporter and is part of the official record of the trial.160 After
the conference the judge and lawyers return to the courtroom, and the
judge poses the questions to the witness.6
The judge also has the option of briefly explaining to the jury that
some of the jurors' questions will not be asked.16 Naturally, the judge
could rephrase any juror questions to satisfy the rules of evidence, or
the judge could pursue any line of questioning raised by the jurors'
questions. The traditional rules for questions from the bench govern
any questions asked by the judge.
1 63
Although this procedure would remove the spontaneity of the ques-
tions, eliminating jury exposure to an improper question and answer
offsets this disadvantage.16 4 Anonymity also eliminates any potential
risk that a juror might try to violate the prohibition against beginning
deliberations prior to conclusion of the trial by using the questioning
process to communicate with the other jurors about the case. The risk
of excessive questioning, however, remains a potential drawback.16 5
The direct method and the two indirect methods of questioning
have their own inherent advantages and disadvantages. The circum-
stances surrounding the witness's testimony will dictate the method of
soliciting juror questions. Since the procedures to be used are ulti-
mately at the judge's discretion, the procedures could be varied accord-
ing to the type of testimony. Thus, if an expert witness is testifying, the
158. Note, supra note 65, at 705-07. One commentator has suggested that the judge could
review the written questions and ask those questions that do not contain obvious relevancy or
competency problems without consulting the attorneys. See id. at 707. This method would not
eliminate, however, the problems associated with objecting to juror questions in front of the jury.
Id. Because this suggestion fails to address this problem, this method tends to eliminate the value
of soliciting questions in writing. Id.; see United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17, 19 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 243 (1989).
159. Id.
160. Note, supra note 65, at 706-07.
161. Id. at 707.
162. Id. If the judge chooses not to inform the entire jury that one of their questions has
been ruled inadmissible, the judge may antagonize only the juror who submitted the question.
Obviously, if the jurors talk to each other during the case, the judge's decision to remain silent
could backfire.
163. The judge's ability to rephrase the questions is included in the judge's right to ask ques-
tions. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional rules of judicial
questioning).
164. Note, supra note 9, at 156.
165. Resolution of this issue ultimately depends on how seriously the members of the jury
take their duty and whether the trial judge is willing to admonish the jurors to use restraint once
juror questioning becomes excessive.
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judge might allow jurors to ask any questions that relate to the defini-
tion of terms used in the testimony as the questions arise. On the other
hand, if the witness is a victim of a violent crime,1a for example, the
judge might decide to delay juror questioning until after the witness has
finished testifying. The judge also might choose to screen in chambers
in the presence of both parties' attorneys any questions posed to the
victim. Of course, the judge still has the option of utilizing only one
screening procedure. 
1 7
4. Scope of Juror Questioning
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an attorney who cross-exam-
ines a witness generally is limited to questioning the witness on matters
that have been the subject of direct examination. 68 The rules, however,
do give the judge discretion to allow broader questioning when neces-
sary.1 9 Judges have the discretion to extend this notion to juror ques-
tions.1 70 Ultimately, the issue is whether the judge can maintain
effective control over the courtroom and the questioning process. The
judge has the following options: (1) limiting the scope of juror question-
ing to those matters raised during direct and cross-examination, and (2)
allowing any relevant questions that do not violate the rules of
evidence.
If the juror is limited to asking questions that are within the scope
of direct and cross-examination, the juror can clarify only information
raised during the testimony. The juror cannot ask questions on subjects
that the parties have omitted.1 7 1 Under this approach, the judge
reduces the opportunity for prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise harmful
166. Rape victims, in particular, have difficulty testifying when only the prosecutor, defense
attorney, and judge are allowed to ask questions. Allowing 12 more people to ask questions could
turn the trial into an inquisition unnecessarily.
167. The parties usually outline the purpose and content of each witness's testimony for op-
posing counsel and the judge before the trial commences. Thus, the judge can choose a questioning
method prior to trial.
168. FED. R. Evm. 611(b) states: "Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter
of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in
the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination." See
generally Note, supra note 65, at 700.
169. Note, supra note 65, at 700.
170. See People v. Knapper, 230 A.D. 487, 492, 245 N.Y.S. 245, 251 (App. Div. 1930) (dis-
couraging juror questioning, but noting that courts have held that a juror question is not error if
the juror clearly asked the question in a good faith attempt to elicit facts overlooked by counsel)
(quoting White v. Little, 131 Okla. 132, 134, 268 P.2d 221, 222 (1928)); Note, supra note 9, at 157;
Note, supra note 65, at 700. The Federal Rules of Evidence are designed to leave the operation of
the courtroom and the questioning of witnesses almost entirely within the judge's discretion. FED.
R. EvID. 611(a), (b).
171. See Note, supra note 9, at 157-58 (stating that courts are split over whether jurors can
ask questions about omitted information); Note, supra note 65 at 702-03.
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inquiries. 172 Furthermore, the relevance of the questions is ensured be-
cause the jury questions are limited to topics on the record.17 3
The second option allows jurors to ask questions that are germane
to the issues. 17 4 The jurors can venture outside the realm of clarifying
testimony and ask questions that they believe are necessary for making
a proper determination in the case.175 Jurors who use this method are
more informed about the case than usual, but the risk of unnecessary
and frivolous questions increases dramatically.17  If the questioning
process is not controlled carefully, this procedure also gives jurors the
opportunity to turn the trial into an inquisition.17 7 Some commentators
have argued that the problems associated with this second method are
offset by allowing general questions, which lessen the risk that counsel
might attempt to hide evidence from the jury.178 Unfortunately, the
commentators making this argument have overlooked the fact that the
judge already has the power to ask witnesses questions to prevent attor-
neys from hiding evidence. 17 9
V. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF JURORS QUESTIONING WITNESSES:
THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES
During the past ten years at least three major studies have ad-
dressed juror questioning: a study conducted in the Second Circuit and
two studies by Professor Stephen Penrod and Mr. Larry Heuer.10 The
studies are based on real trials during which jurors were allowed to pose
172. Note, supra note 65, at 702-03. For example, the constraint of asking questions only on
issues raised during direct and cross-examination automatically eliminates questioning on insur-
ance and remedial measures since the attorneys do not ask these questions. See supra note 153.
Thus, these issues would be placed outside of the permissible scope of juror questioning. See supra
note 168 and accompanying text.
173. See Note, supra note 65, at 702-03.
174. See Nelson v. State, 257 Ark. 1, 513 S.W.2d 496 (1974); Note, supra note 9, at 157 &
n.175.
175. See sources cited supra note 175.
176. Note, supra note 65, at 701.
177. Id. at 701-02.
178. See Note, supra note 65, at 701 (noting that because attorneys are not protected from
attempts by the judge or opposing counsel to obtain information that has been omitted, no reason
exists for denying this power from the jury).
179. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
180. The first study was conducted in the Second Circuit from 1982 to 1985. The results were
published in 1985 in an issue of the New York University Law Review. See Sand & Reiss, supra
note 101, at 423. Heuer and Penrod administered the other two experiments. One was carried out
in Wisconsin and involved approximately 70 trials. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237. The
other was sponsored by the American Judicature Society and the State Justice Institute; the pre-
liminary results were reported in The Docket, the journal for the National Institute for Trial Ad-
vocacy. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 4. A more complete discussion of the second Heuer and
Penrod study was published as this Note was being printed. See Heuer & Penrod, Some Sugges-
tions for the Critical Appraisal of a More Active Jury, 85 Nw. U.L. REv. 226 (1990).
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questions to witnesses under an indirect questioning method in which
the judge screened written questions. 181 Because the judges and lawyers
in each Heuer and Penrod study agreed to participate in the study at
the outset,1 82 the results could be skewed in favor of allowing jurors to
ask questions.
Significantly, in each of the studies, the jurors who could question
witnesses were more satisfied with their jury service than those who
were not allowed to ask questions. 83 This satisfaction stemmed from
the additional involvement of asking questions.184 Jurors claimed that
they were less worried about an incorrect verdict because asking ques-
tions eliminated their concerns about insufficient information.185 De-
spite this fact, however, several judges who participated in the Second
Circuit study concluded that they would not allow juror questions in
the future.5 6
The other important finding in the studies focused on the number
of questions asked and the parties' satisfaction with the procedure. The
Second Circuit study revealed no correlation between the number of
questions asked and the judge's perception of the utility of the proce-
dure. 1 87 One of the Heuer and Penrod studies, however, found that
judges became more concerned with the utility of the procedure as the
number of questions increased. 88
The Heuer and Penrod studies also showed that the belief that jury
questions uncover pertinent and helpful information189 has been exag-
gerated.190 Benefits in this area were modest at best.1 9' Modern discov-
ery methods and the adversarial process may have eliminated the
181. See sources cited supra note 180. For a discussion of the indirect questioning method,
see supra notes 146-65 and accompanying text.
182. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 4; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237. In the
Second Circuit study only the judges agreed to participate. Sand & Reiss, supra note 101, at 423.
183. See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 10. In the first Heuer and Penrod study, the
results indicated that juror questioning decreased juror doubts about the testimony. Heuer & Pen-
rod, supra note 16, at 231. The study, however, was unable to verify the hypothesis that juror
questioning increases juror satisfaction with the trial procedure.
Four of the judges in the Second Circuit study noted that they had sensed that the question-
ing process focused the jurors' attention on important issues, increased jurors' sense of involve-
ment in the case, and kept the jurors more alert. Sand & Reiss, supra note 101, at 446.
184. See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 10.
185. Id.; see also Sand & Reiss, supra note 101, at 444.
186. Sand & Reiss, supra note 101, at 444.
187. Id. at 446.
188. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 5; see also Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237.
189. See State v. Kendall, 143 N.C. 659, 57 S.E. 340 (1907); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 98-100.
190. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 10; see also Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237;
supra note 101 and accompanying text.
191. See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 10; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237.
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surprises that, in the past, had arisen in the middle of a case.19 2 The
studies further revealed that juror questions provided little instruction
about the jurors' understanding of the evidence and law in the case.193
This discovery is surprising because juror understanding was one of the
principal reasons that commentators have cited for the adoption of ju-
ror questioning. 94 In addition, the studies have not provided informa-
tion on juror bias.195 Since researchers are not allowed to watch actual
jury deliberations, empirical proof in this area will be difficult.9'
Notably, the Second Circuit study found a divergence between the
views of attorneys for the prosecution or the plaintiff and those repre-
senting the defense. 97 Prosecutors and plaintiff counsel were over-
whelmingly in favor of allowing jurors to ask questions. 98 On the other
hand, defense counsel were split on the subject, with several attorneys
strongly opposed to allowing jurors to ask questions. 9 Unfortunately,
the study did not offer a reason for this important split.
20 0
One potential explanation is that the defense attorneys believed
that they were unable to hide information when jurors were allowed to
ask questions. This explanation is unlikely, however, because even in
the absence of juror questioning the judge could ask questions.20 1 An
alternative explanation is that the jurors became biased against the de-
fense by the time the defense started to present its case. None of the
studies have considered this possibility, but any juror bias should be-
come apparent in the questions asked by the jury members.
VI. ANALYsIs
Juror questioning definitely can be a useful procedure in certain
limited situations. The usefulness of juror questioning of witnesses dur-
192. See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 10; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237.
193. E.g., Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 10; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 254.
194. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 10. This problem may stem from the fact that the
screening procedures used to weed out potentially biased or improper questions are time consum-
ing and, therefore, discourage jury members from asking questions.
195. Id. at 5 (stating that a "final concern is that when an objection to a juror's question is
sustained, the jury will draw inappropriate inferences").
196. Id. Heuer and Penrod have assunmed that judicial dissatisfaction with jury verdicts
would increase if the jurors became biased. Many cases are close, however, and the jury could
return with a verdict that favors one party without the jury bias being evident. In addition, the
jury instructions that the judge gives can lead the jury to a verdict and have a great impact on the
outcome of the case. Thus, the instructions may override any jury biases. Finally, the jurors in the
Heuer and Penrod studies did not ask a significant number of questions; therefore, the judges had
even more difficulty determining whether the jurors had become biased. See id. at 4.
197. Sand & Reiss, supra note 101, at 444-45.
198. Id. at 445.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
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ing trials, however, has been exaggerated. The proponents of the proc-
ess have overlooked several important factors.
A. Ineffectiveness of Remedial Instructions
Proponents of jury questioning have made the fundamental as-
sumption that a judge easily can rectify problems arising from an im-
proper juror question with a remedial instruction. Unfortunately, a
remedial instruction often falls to achieve its stated purpose. 02 Jurors
have great difficulty ignoring a piece of information simply because a
judge has instructed them to disregard it.
B. Problems Arising from Either Failing to Object or Objecting to
Juror Questions
Another negative consequence of juror questioning is the added
possibility that issues will be waived on appeal. If attorneys fall to ob-
ject to questions, they risk forfeiting the ability to appeal an issue aris-
ing out of the line of questions posed by jurors.20 3 Attorneys who fail to
preserve issues on appeal drastically increase the possibility of a mal-
practice suit, and prosecutors jeopardize their jobs.
Although the malpractice suit filed by the disgruntled client may
have no chance of succeeding, these nuisance suits remain costly be-
cause of the effect on the lawyer's malpractice insurance premiums, the
lost billable time associated with defending oneself, and the cost of set-
tling when the lawyer is not insured. An attorney's reputation is also in
danger of being tarnished. This risk is likely to increase further if other
states follow the Florida decision eliminating the "gag" rule, which had
precluded disgruntled clients from publicly discussing their claims
against their attorneys.0 4
Problems with failing to object are great, but the problems associ-
ated with objecting are equally significant. If lawyers do object to juror
questions, they risk antagonizing the jury.20 5 Proponents of juror ques-
tioning have argued that indirect screening of questions lessens the risk
of antagonizing the jury.2 06 This risk should not be underestimated
202. See DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 1985).
203. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
204. See Resnick, Florida Gag Rule Is Abolished, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 5, 1990, at 3.
205. In United States v. Lewin, 900 F.2d 145, 147-48 (8th Cir. 1990), the Eighth Circuit
noted that although juror questioning is not per se improper and is within the discretion of the
trial court, id. at 147 (citing United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17, 19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 243 (1989)), it could not condone the practice of inviting juror questions, especially when the
procedure utilized required jurors to pose questions aloud or required attorneys to object within
the hearing of the jury. Id.
206. See supra notes 146-67 and accompanying text.
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since jurors should be able to discern who is objecting to their ques-
tions.20 7 Objecting does not eliminate the possibility of malpractice ac-
tions. Attorneys may face malpractice suits for antagonizing the jury
with too many objections.
208
C. Potential Abuse of the System
Another suggested advantage of juror questioning is that the attor-
neys would benefit from knowing what issues the jury is considering
and whether the jurors are confused about certain issues or areas of
testimony.0 9 While this reason is legitimate, the attorneys also can
abuse the system.210 For example, even if the judge decides to prohibit a
juror's question as a violation of a rule of evidence, the attorney still
can reveal the prohibited information in the examination of another
witness or in a closing statement. A clever attorney, therefore, can cir-
cumvent the judge's ruling and get the information to the jury.
2 1
D. Adverse Effects on Trial Efficiency
Commentators also have argued that jury questioning will not add
significant amounts of time to the trial process. 212 This proposition is
true, however, only if the judge discourages jurors from asking large
numbers of questions.213 Yet, discouraging jurors from asking questions
reduces or eliminates the advantages of the questioning process. This
discouragement might explain why many of the lawyers and jurors who
participated in the two Heuer and Penrod studies found the question-
ing procedure to be only marginally helpful.2 4 If the process is only
marginally helpful, it may not be worth the added risk of a reversal on
207. See J. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY (1987). See generally T.
MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES (1988).
208. Federal Rule of Evidence 11 and many state courts allow a party to seek the recovery of
attorney's fees stemming from the defense of a frivolous law suit. See, e.g., Boone v. Superior
Court, 145 Ariz. 235, 700 P.2d 1335 (1985); Stevens v. Kiraly, 24 Ohio App. 3d 211, 494 N.E.2d
1160 (Ct. App. 1985); Wilson v. Henkle, 45 Wash. App. 162, 724 P.2d 1069 (Ct. App. 1986). See
generally Annotation, Attorney's Liability for Fees, 56 A.L.R. 4th 486 (1987). The attorney still
will not be compensated, however, for the lost billable time or a damaged reputation.
209. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. Courts should allow the attorneys to ask
a witness additional questions to clarify any issues that the juror questioning might have raised.
See Note, supra note 65, at 705-06 & n.125 (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b) gives a
judge discretion to allow redirect questioning).
210. See Informal Notes, supra note 135.
211. Id.
212. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 5; see also Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 238,
254-55.
213. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 7, at 4.
214. In each of the Heuer and Penrod studies, the typical pretrial instruction reminded the
jury that the questioning of witnesses is primarily the lawyers' responsibility and that they were




The obvious way to foster satisfaction with juror questioning is to
make it easier for jurors to ask questions. Unfortunately, encouraging
questions dramatically increases the risk that jurors will become too in-
volved in the case and lose their sense of impartiality.21 5 If the jury
becomes partisan, the entire concept of trial by a fair and impartial jury
is threatened, especially if a few jurors start to question witnesses in an
attempt to deliberate with other jurors before the completion of
testimony. 16
E. Problems with Discouraging or Halting Juror Questions Mid-
Way Through Trial
If juror questioning becomes unwieldy or time consuming a judge
may discourage or even halt juror questioning entirely, as in the Tex-
aco-Penzoil case. 17 If juror questioning builds rapport between the law-
yers and the members of the jury and if the questioning is halted after
only the plaintiff has utilized the process, then the defense would be at
a severe disadvantage. When a judge limits questioning, the jury might
infer that the party who was being hurt by the questioning brought
about the judge's decision, regardless of the reason for the judge's deci-
sion. Discouraging or halting juror questioning mid-way through the
trial is potentially more dangerous to the right to an impartial jury than
jury antagonism resulting from a lawyer's repeated objections to juror
questions.
F. Juror Questioning in Complex Litigation
The proponents of juror questioning have argued that this process
would be extremely valuable in complex litigation, particularly when
the testimony describes complicated business practices that are difficult
for a lay person to grasp.218 Several of the most famous business trials
of the 1980s, including the Texaco-Penzoil battle over Getty Oil,219 the
GAF insider trading case,220 and a shareholder derivative suit arising
out of the Continental Illinois bankruptcy,2 1 used juror questioning
215. See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 16, at 237.
216. Id.
217. The judge halted juror questioning in the Texaco-Penzoil case in the middle of the trial
because the judge found that it was too time consuming and unwieldy. Steinbreder, The $10-Bil-
lion Misunderstanding, FORTUNE, Dec. 23, 1985, at 6 (discussing the $10 billion verdict in the
Texaco-Penzoil case).
218. See id. at 6.
219. Id.
220. Riley, Case of the Uncharged Co-Conspirator, N.Y. Newsday, Dec. 27, 1988, at 33.
221. Weiner, Whose Fault: Continental Illinois or the Auditor?: As Civil Trial Enters
Fourth Month, the Legal Bills-and Tensions-Begin to Mount, AM. BANKER, May 18, 1987, at 2.
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during at least part of the trial.222 Jury questioning in complex cases
may not be the proper response, however. In fact, many of the partici-
pants in these cases questioned the utility of the procedure.223
Because of the complexity of these trials and the difficulty of the
issues, few people would argue that a juror who does not understand a
term used in expert testimony should be precluded from asking the wit-
ness to explain the term. In complex litigation jurors also are likely to
have a large number of questions and to develop proprietary interests
in these questions. As a result, they may lose the objectivity needed to
reach a just verdict.
224
Many of the problems with complex litigation can be avoided by
using other less risky procedures instead of allowing jurors to ask more
than definitional questions. The most obvious solution is for the parties
to opt for a nonjury trial.225 This option is not likely to occur, however,
because if one side expresses a desire to avoid a jury trial, the opponent
will request one for strategic purposes. Another option is to preinstruct
the jury on the relevant points of law to be discussed in the case.226 The
preinstruction would guide the jury through the many hours of evidence
during the course of the trial by helping the jury members identify the
lines of testimony relevant to their deliberations. 22 At the end of the
trial, the judge again would charge the jurors to refresh their memories
and to provide further instruction on any additional information that
had developed during the course of the trial.228 Finally, the judge could
aid the jury further during the course of the trial by periodically sum-
marizing the information presented for the jury or allowing counsel to
do so.
G. Threats to Jury Impartiality
The most compelling argument against juror questioning, however,
is that the jury's role will be distorted regardless of the selected method
and the utilization of elaborate screening mechanisms. The problem, as
222. See supra note 217.
223. For instance, the first judge in the Texaco-Penzoil case abandoned the practice during
the trial because he felt that the delays associated with the questioning process outweighed any
utility that it might have. Steinbreder, supra note 217, at 6.
224. See generally Note, supra note 65, at 706. When these concerns are combined with the
fact that attorneys attempt to select jurors who are biased in their favor, a major problem exists.
225. Moreover, it probably would be unconstitutional for Congress to mandate nonjury trials
merely because the litigation is complex. See U.S. CONsT. amends. VI and VII. Informal surveys of
judges have indicated that judges encounter cases too complex for a jury at least once during their
careers on the bench. See Goodman, Greene & Loftus, What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases,
TRIuL, Nov. 1985, at 65.





noted in a concurring opinion in United States v. Johnson,229 is that
the jury is intended to be a neutral fact finder in the adversary process.
This neutrality is naturally at risk whenever the jury is afforded an op-
portunity to ask questions that move beyond basic elements of a wit-
ness's testimony."' Cases in which other members of the jury hear the
questions that the judge refuses to ask are especially problematic be-
cause both the juror who raised the question and the other members of
the jury may retain the opinion generated by the question. 31 Chief
Judge Donald Lay and Judge Theodore McMillian argued in Johnson
that even an innocent response to a question that appears to be innocu-
ous can influence a juror's appraisal of the credibility of the witness and
the parties to the case.23 2 Although this viewpoint may be extreme, it is
fundamentally sound especially when the ultimate fact finder in the
case has chosen sides prematurely. Biased jurors might not be receptive
to further suggestions of a different outcome of the case. As Judges Lay
and McMillian noted, nothing can assure that the jury will remain
open-minded, but neutrality is fostered when jurors are kept out of the
advocacy process.233
VII. CONCLUSION
Recent discussions among legal scholars about juror questioning of
witnesses have generated a significant amount of favorable press for the
procedure. Many of the commentators who have written on the subject,
however, have exaggerated the importance and effectiveness of juror
questioning. Admittedly, two-way communication is more effective than
one-way communication, and jurors probably should be able to ask
questions about the basic elements of a witness's testimony. Once the
questioning extends beyond the simple clarification of a definition or a
piece of testimony, however, the risks of prejudicing the jury and unrea-
sonably delaying the trial increase drastically. In fact, the constitutional
guarantee of a fair and impartial jury may be jeopardized. In the end,
the risks outweigh the utility of the questioning procedure, and thus the
experiment of juror questioning should cease.
Jeffrey S. Berkowitz
229. 892 F.2d 707, 713 (8th Cir. 1989) (Lay, C.J., joined by McMillian, J., concurring).
230. Id. (Lay, C.J., joined by McMillian, J., concurring).
231. See United States v. Land, 877 F.2d 17, 19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 243 (1989).
232. Johnson, 892 F.2d at 713 (Lay, C.J., joined by McMillian, J., concurring).
233. Id. (Lay, C.J., joined by McMillian, J., concurring).
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